This
document, titled "The Size and Composition of the Anti-Nazi
Opposition in Germany," was found among the reports of the
United States Strategic Bombing Survey (USSB) of the U.S.
Air Force in the National Archives. The finder was Professor
Karl-Heinz Reuband of the Institute of the Social Sciences
of the Heinrich Heine University of Dusseldorf, who was
engaged in research on German attitudes during the Nazi
period. The report was identified in handwriting, "Technical
Report, G. Almond." There is an illegible set of letters and
numbers, designating its location in the National Archives.
Professor Reuband notified me of his find, and sent me a
copy.
This
report, written in a collaboration with my colleague
Wolfgang Kraus, the details of which I have forgotten, was
one of the supporting reports of the Morale Division of
USSBS. The Morale Division was headed by Rensis Likert,
later of University of Michigan Survey Research Center fame.
The USSBS social science team included several of the social
psychologists who would later staff the Institute of Social
Sciences and the Survey Research Center of the University of
Michigan--Rensis Likert, Angus Campbell, Daniel Katz, Dorwin
Cartwright, as well as Otto Klineberg and Herbert Hyman of
Columbia University. The major job of the Morale Division
was to conduct an attitude survey on the effects of bombing
on German morale using a questionnaire administered to
probability sample of Germans in the immediate aftermath of
the war.
In the
Morale Division I was given the assignment of planning and
conducting a supplementary study on documentary sources,
such as surviving records of German police and intelligence
organization and on interviews with captured and interned
Gestapo and Sicherheitsdienst officials and surviving
opposition leaders.
My
section consisted of two six-men teams: one headed by me,
and a second headed by Wolfgang Kraus, a political scientist
knowledgeable about National Socialist Germany who was on
leave from George Washington University. Each team had a
jeep and weapons carrier, and consisted of two
German-speaking GIs and one or two militay personnel. My
team went east, first to Leipzig and Halle--to territory
that would end up in the Soviet Zone, but at the time
recently American-captured and still American-occupied--and
then north to the British Zone--to Hannover, Braunschweig,
Hamburg, Bremen, and Luebeck. Kraus's team went first to
Cologne and then south to the American Zone, working in
Wiesbaden, Mainz, Darmstadt, Frankfurt, and Munich. From
mid-May until mid-July, the two teams were in the field
accumulating documents, interviewing in the internment
camps, and interviewing opposition and concentration camp
survivors. In mid-July we gathered in Bad Nauheim, at the
headquarters of the Strategic Bombing Survey, and drafte d
the report. The report drew on our interviews and
documentary materials. Some of the prose was written by
Wolfgang Kraus, but I drafted and edited the final report.
Wolfgang Kraus and I continued our collaboration when we
returned to the States, ultimately producing two coauthored
chapters on the German resistance in a book published in
1948. [1]
This is
the text of our report.
Gabriel
A. Almond
June 11,
1999
Data
concerning the existence, size, and significance of an
anti-Nazi opposition within Germany are forthcoming from two
primary sources. The first source is the direct testimony of
opposition leaders still surviving after the occupation; the
second source consists of official German intelligence
reports or interrogations of interned Gestapo and
Sicherheitsdienst officials. The direct testimony of
opposition leaders is, of course, subject to the
qualification that it is to the interest of the leader and
his group to represent the activities of his movement during
the war years in the best possible light. Estimates of the
size and scope of activities provided by such leaders may be
viewed as more or less exaggerated. However the experience
of Bombing Survey Field Teams also suggests that such
estimates may in some cases be low rather than high because
of the extreme secrecy in which such movements were forced
to operate. For example, a number of Communist leaders knew
in general terms that other Communist grou ps and cells were
operating in their area, but because of the absence of any
connection they were unable to estimate the size of the
group. Throughout the opposition movement it was an
elementary principle of safety, confirmed by repeated
experience with Gestapo terror and torture, never to know
more about the personnel and activities of the movement than
was absolutely essential. In evaluating the information from
this source it is also necessary to keep in mind that the
best informants in a great many cases had been executed in
the last wave of terror. Frequently the knowledge of the
survivors was fragmentary; many of those who had occupied
central points in the organization had fallen.
To some
extent the lack of precise information from the side of the
opposition groups themselves can be made good by official
statistics and reports of the Nazi police agencies. [2] Here
again the data are fragmentary because of the generally
thorough execution of the order to destroy documents and
records before the occupation. Even when such documents have
been preserved official statistics of subversive and
oppositional activity are subject to question. From the
testimony of Gestapo officials it would appear to have been
a frequent practice on the part of regional officials to
"pad" their arrest statistics in order to show "progress".
It is apparent, therefore that in dealing with quantitative
estimates from either the oppositional or the official Nazi
side, some correction must be made for exaggeration.
Some
idea of the extent of oppositional activity throughout
Germany can be obtained from the statistics of arrests by
the Gestapo for the first six months of 1944 [Table 1].
The
statistics of arrests for political offences for the first
three months of 1944 give a general picture of the frequency
of such acts throughout the Reich. However, acts of both
Germans and foreign workers are grouped together. Even more
confusion results from the fact that under
"Reaction-Opposition" are included not only acts emanating
from or tending toward the formation of right-wing groups,
but the whole range of individual acts of opposition covered
under "treachery" (Heimtuckeangelelegenheiten). This
category includes arrests of individuals for the spreading
of rumors, making jokes about the regime, listening to the
BBC, etc. [Table 2].
Data for
April, May, and June give us a clearer picture of the extent
and composition of opposition in this period. Arrests for
what the Gestapo labelled "communist" activity among Germans
ranged from around 400 to more than 500 per month; while
arrests for Marxist (Social-Democratic) activity were around
100 per month. "Reaction" (including "legitimism" and
"liberalism") ranged between 300 and 350 for the same
period. Figures for the last half of 1944 would undoubtedly
have shown a large increase because of the wave of arrests
among all oppositional circles after the July attempt on
Hitler's life. The number of arrests in connection with this
attempt has been estimated anywhere between 5,000 and
20,000.
For the
three month period from April to June 1944 the number of
arrests for Communist activity among Germans alone was 1442,
for Social Democratic activity 282, for "Middle" and "right
wing" opposition 1014. Individual "acts of treachery" not
definitely connected with organized oppositional activity
amounted to 4,426. Recognizing the possible exaggerations in
these figures it is nevertheless legitimate to conclude that
the frequency of organized oppositional activity, was
probably several times the number of arrests
This
impression is confirmed by interviews with oppositional
leaders in various parts of Germany. In Hamburg, a city with
a strong left wing tradition, a large number of anti-Nazi
groups were identified. In the beginning of 1945 an
Antifaschistiches Deutsches Kampf Komittee was established.
This group was supposed to have included 700 Communists,
Social Democrats, and other left wing elements, 200 of whom
were organized into armed Hundertschaften (hundreds). The
group possessed stolen antiaircraft guns, machine guns,
rifles, and pistols. A former leader of the Social
Democratic Reichsbanner (the Socialist paramilitary
organization) estimated that about 600 former Reichsbanner
men continued to meet together in small groups of 3-4.
In the
Hamburg shipyards and plants anti-Nazi cells operated
throughout the period of the war. In the Deutsche Werft, the
largest shipyard on the continent, there was a nucleus of 36
primarily Communist activists with a larger group of
sympathizers. In the Blohm and Voss shipyard it was
estimated that some 250-300 workers were organized into
anti-Nazi groups. In Menck and Hambrock, manufacturers of
construction implements, there was a nucleus of 12 activists
and a larger group of sympathizers. In the Hamburger
Oelwerke there was a consolidated Communist and Social
Democratic group of about 25 in 1944.
In
Bremen the Communists had about two hundred activists. This
figure was reported both from Gestapo and Communist sources.
The Sozialistische Arbeiterpartei, a group to the left of
the Social Democrats, had some thirty to forty activists.
The Social Democrats had a few informal social groups. The
aircraft plants FockeWulf and Weser Flugzeug A. G. had some
thirty Communists. The shipyard Deschmag had around a
hundred anti-fascists. In 1944 they formed a consolidated
organization called "Kampf gegen Fascismus" (KGF)
Immediately after the Allied occupation the KGF claimed a
membership of over four thousand in Bremen, three-fourths
from left wing groups, and the remainder from "middle of the
road" elements.
The
Social Democrats in Luebeck had a group of some 25-30 active
members who met regularly and participated in political
discussions during the early years of the war. By 1944 the
SPD opposition numbered around two hundred, inclusive of
foreign workers. In March of 1945 the activities of the
group were discovered and most of the leaders were arrested.
The Luebeck KPD in 1939 had 25-30 Germans organized in
groups of three (Dreiergruppen). They had cells in the
munitions plants, Deutsche Waffen and Munitionsfabrik and
the Massenverpackung fuer Munition. in the last months
before the occupation the KPD had an organized group of some
225 armed Germans and foreign workers. In March of 1945 the
plan of this group to seize central points in Luebeck in
order to prevent the town's defence was discovered and some
20 of the movement's leaders were arrested.
In
Leipzig in 1943 a number of left wing groups formed a
National Kommittee Freies Deutschland in response to Russian
Radio propaganda. After the July 20, 1944 attempt on
Hitler's life there were a large number of arrests, and in
early 1945 some 53 leaders of the NKFD were executed. The
membership of the NKFD immediately before the occupation is
estimated at 300-400 members. Immediately after the
occupation the group claimed a membership of several
thousands. Halle numbered some 30 active Communists and
Social Democrats. By 1943 it was claimed that among the
police reservists there were 125 men ready to put themselves
at the disposal of the opposition. Shortly before the
occupation a consolidated Anti-Nationalsocialistische
Bewegung was formed.
In the
Ruhr and the Rheinland there is evidence of oppositional
activity during the war years, but quantitative estimates
from the side of the opposition itself are not available.
The SPD and the KPD had small groups, but the former leaders
of the Zentrum did not engage in organized opposition. The
Gestapo reported more than 150 arrests in the Cologne area
during the first six months of 1944; Dortmund reported 30.
In
Frankfurt a/M the left claimed to have a hundred activists
and sympathizers. Several of the industrial plants in the
area had underground cells. In south Germany there is
evidence of the existence of left wing groups in such towns
as Munich, Kempten, and Tuebingen. An NKFD group was formed
in Munich at the beginning of 1944.
Significance of Oppositional Activities for the Allied War
Effort
Propaganda
During the years of the war, the major activity of the left
wing oppositional groups was the spreading of propaganda. In
the earlier years of the Nazi regime, the issuance of
leaflets and even small newspapers was a commonplace. As the
Nazi terror became more effective the issuance of leaflets
became less frequent and the primary propaganda medium
became mundpropaganda, the spread of information and slogans
by word of mouth. This was done systematically. News heard
from BBC the night before would be spread among the workers
in the "breakfast pause", or at lunch time in the plants.
One of
the most important contributions of the opposition for the
air campaign of the Allies was the effort of many of the
opposition organizations to counteract the Nazi Luftterror
propaganda. In Leipzig the NKFD distributed a leaflet after
the great raid of December 1943. The leaflet in part reads
as follows:
The Nazi
bosses are attempting to use this bombing attack as they are
using the whole air war, as a means of directing the
attention of the masses away from those who are truly guilty
and strengthening their own piratical war effort. We
anti-Fascists say to you:
1. The
air war is a part of the whole war. Whoever is against the
air war and its terrible effects, must be against the whole
criminal war.
2. The
air war was begun by Hitler and the German war criminals,
just as the war in general was begun by them. Hitler wanted
to "coventrize" the English cities, and to "erase" all of
England. The Nazi press reported with sadistic satisfaction
the destruction and suffering in England caused by the air
attacks of the German air force. Therefore whoever is
against the air war, must be against the man who started it,
must be against Hitler.
3. The
air war proves that Germany is conquerable. What do you
think of Goering's false promises now, that no enemy
airplanes would ever cross the German border? Just as you
have been betrayed in this regard, so have the Nazis lied to
you in all respects. We say to you: All Germany will lie in
ruins, if we don't throw out these war criminals. The
military power of the Allies is already so strong that the
fate of Germany is settled. Therefore we say to you: Make an
end of this hopeless war!
4. In
every raid the Nazi leaders bring themselves to safety in
plenty of time. They have their specially safe shelters.
They have villas and country houses in Bavaria and the Tirol,
where they can go in the event that their houses are damaged
and continue their luxurious existence. They have their
second layout of furniture and linens and everything else
long in safety. Therefore remove these Nazi bosses.
5. The
Nazis are consoling the people who have suffered from raids
with the promise of revenge. With this promise of revenge
the people are supposed to hope for victory. We say to you:
that is also a lie. Even if we should discover a weapon of
revenge, this discovery will be turned against us and the
air war against Germany will take on proportions which are
unimaginable. Therefore we say to you: Don't believe in this
swindle of Nazi revenge!
The
Leipzig Anti-Fascists tell you what to do. When an air raid
comes, first you must save your own life. Run to safety. In
case of an air raid, leave the armament plants and take care
of your families and dwellings. The whole war industry may
be destroyed, but you must preserve your own lives. Don't
permit the Nazi industrial bosses or the plant police to
keep you in the factory. After a raid stay away from your
job; excuse yourself by claiming the need of cleaning up
debris, or poor transportation conditions. "Langsam arbeiten"
leads to a quicker end of the war. Help one another when it
is possible to save the lives, dwellings, and possessions of
other workers. The life of the German worker is a thousand
times more important than the armament plants of the Nazi
criminals.
Fight
with the Anti-Fascists against the Total War of Hitler for a
Total Peace!
Similar
leaflets were reported to have been distributed in such
towns as Hamburg, Bremen, and Cologne, but copies were no
longer available. Where there were no leaflets, similar
arguments were advanced orally at the breakfast and lunch
periods in plants, in queues before stores, even in shelters
during the long period of anxious waiting.
Sabotage
Sabotage
in its more dramatic forms was not frequent. There are some
reports of sabotage of U-boats and other vessels by German
Communists in the Hamburg and Bremen shipyards. The Gestapo
in Hannover discovered frequent cases of sabotage in
armament plants for which Russian workers were primarily
responsible. But wherever there were left wing oppositional
groups the slogan "Langsam Arbeiten" was spread.
Oppositional activists in positions of administrative
responsibility sometimes sabotaged on the job. A woman
member of the NKFD in Leipzig who was in charge of female
labor discipline in the Reichstreuhaender der Arbeit (the
agency in charge of foreign workers), administered the
minimum penalty, and encouraged some of her colleagues to do
the same. Foremen in the Deutsche Werft in Hamburg
deliberately wasted steel, and slowed down U-boat production
by delaying in the transmission of information as to changes
in design.
Undermining of Volkssturm and Efforts to Prevent Last-Ditch
Resistance
As the
war neared an end and the German military manpower shortage
became more and more apparent the Nazis attempted to ensure
a last ditch resistance through the calling up of the
Volkssturm (the levy of older men and boys). There is
evidence from a number of areas from opposition sources that
anti-fascist groups attempted to infiltrate the Volkssturm
and undermine its will to resist. Certainly, on the whole
the poor record of the Volkssturm cannot be attributed to
this oppositional sabotage. Even to Nazis the small numbers,
lack of training, and inferior arms of the Volkssturm in
contrast to the numbers and equipment of the attacking
troops was apparent. This overwhelming physical and
technical disproportion and the general hopelessness of
resistance were undoubtedly the primary factors in the
widespread demoralization of Volkssturm units. But wherever
there were oppositional groups efforts were made to render
the hopelessness of resistance clear through propaganda.
In a
number of cases oppositional groups put pressure on the
authorities to yield towns without fighting; in one or two
cases armed uprisings were planned to yield areas without
resistance.
The
Leipzig NKFD issued a leaflet on April 14 exhorting the
Germans not to defend the town.
The
Nazi regime is about to collapse! American and English
troops stand before our city. In order to avoid further
bloodshed and destruction of the remnants of our residential
and industrial areas, we must mobilize all the anti-fascist
forces. The solution is: an end to the insane war of the
Nazis. The hour of emancipation from Nazi slavery is at
hand. Now it is necessary to act! What is to be done?
No
resistance to the English and Americans!
Resistance means death and destruction!
Resisting soldiers should be disarmed.
Orders
to report to the Volkssturm should be disobeyed!
On April
16 a leaflet in the form of an open letter addressed to the
Oberburgermeister and Polizeipresident of Leipzig was
distributed. The leaflet urged the hopelessness of any
further resistance, and held the authorities responsible for
any death and destruction resulting from resistance in
Leipzig. "We are making you responsible for every sacrifice
and all destruction resulting from resistance .... We demand
surrender of our city without resistance in the interest of
the population of Leipzig."
The
Leipzig opposition leaders claim that in Lindenau, a Leipzig
worker's neighborhood where the NKFD was strong, the
Volkssturm revolted. They also claim that no resistance was
offered the American troops in these workers' areas.
In
Hamburg the Antifa planned an internal revolt in the event
of a decision by Gauleiter Kaufmann to resist. Soldiers in
the Hindenburg and Mackensen barracks are reported as having
been prepared to mutiny. 5,000 copies of a leaflet were
distributed in Blohm and Voss five weeks before the
occupation urging the workers not to defend the town.
Although the workers were threatened if they did not hand in
the leaflets, only 47 of the total were given to the
authorities. During the last weeks before the occupation a
unit of 250 partly armed men was formed among the Blohm and
Voss workers, and it was planned to use these units to seize
key buildings in the town in the event of resistance in
Hamburg. The antifascist organizations also sent delegations
to Hamburg industrialists threatening violence if the town
was defended. The industrialists were ordered to go to the
Gauleiter at once and inform him that the Hamburg workers
were taking up arms and would revolt unless the town were
peacefully surrendered. The Antifa distributed leaflets
among the Volkssturm and posted a public announcement in the
Gaensemarkt (Goose Market) to the effect that the town was
to be surrendered without resistance. The declaration was
torn down by SS men, but not before its contents had become
publicly known.
In
Halle a/S the Anti-Nazional-Sozialistische Bewegung (ANB)
issued two leaflets urging surrender without resistance.
Both of the leaflets urged surrender in order to prevent the
destruction of Halle by thousands of bombers. "People of
Halle," read the first leaflet, "The hour of decision is at
hand. The Americans stand before the gates of the city. Do
not resist the approaching Americans, or else thousands of
bombers ... will lay your city in ashes, and will destroy
you, your wives, and children. Do you wish to die in order
to preserve the lives of the Party bosses for a few days?"
The second leaflet again argued that Halle, which had
suffered very little from raids would be destroyed by bombs
if resistance were offered. "One thing we must prevent: that
our city like all other large German cities should be
reduced to rubble, that our wives and children should be
killed by the tens of thousands. This will certainly happen
if Halle is uselessly defended. A great air raid by Allied
bombers will be the immediate consequence."
Representatives of the ANB met the American forces on the
outskirts of the city, told them the town was undefended and
prevented any attack on the town. Within the city opposition
leaders before the arrival of American troops seized the
police and party headquarters and prevented looting and
destruction of records.
In
Luebeck in March of 1944 the Communist opposition issued a
leaflet urging that the time for active opposition had come,
that the war was lost because of the Allied conquests and
the destruction of German industry by air attacks. The group
had 225 armed men--Germans and foreign workers--and claim to
have had an arsenal of eleven machine guns, 180 rifles, 300
pistols, explosives, and hand grenades. They had a detailed
plan for the seizure of Luebeck, and a number of trucks were
available to them. The plot was discovered on March 23, and
the leaders were imprisoned.
In
Munich the right wing Bavarian separatist group Freedom
Action Bavaria organized an armed revolt on April 28, and
broadcast from a radio station for a short period of time.
The revolt was put down, but the effort stimulated other
groups in the Munich area, and played a role in the
surrender of the town.
The
Effect of Air Raids on Opposition
The
effects of strategic bombing on the extent and effectiveness
of oppositional activity may be treated under three
categories: 1) positive, 2) negative, 3) the effects of
different types of bombing experience on oppositional
activity.
The
primary positive effects of strategic bombing in
oppositional activity were: a) rendering the public more
receptive to oppositional propaganda: b) increasing the size
and the intensity of oppositional group activity; c)
creating physical and administrative disorder which
permitted greater freedom of action on the part of
oppositional groups.
Receptivity to Oppositional Propaganda
The
leaders of the NKFD in Leipzig testified that the great raid
of December 4, 1943 was the "turning point" in German
morale. The raids preceding this had been small and appeared
to have been directed at random targets. These small RAF
night raids had been grist for the Nazi propaganda mill. But
the full significance of strategic bombing was brought home
with the December 1943 raid. To the minds of the Leipzig
population it signified the breakdown of German defense.
From this point on, according to the NKFD leaders it was
possible to reach increasingly larger elements among the
public with propaganda concerning the hopelessness of the
German war situation.
The
Hamburg Communist and Social Democratic leaders similarly
testiied that it was easier to reach workers and bring them
around to the oppositional point of view after air raids.
The workers were more rebellious after raids. A Hamburg
Social Democratic leader asserted that there was a process
of radicalization as the air war was pressed home. The
slogan among the workers was "Better an end with horror,
than horror without end" (Besser eine ende mit schrecken,
als schrecken ohne ende).
The
Bremen opposition leaders claim that air raids did not
result in increasing hatred of the Allies or of the
opposition, but resulted in a widespread opposition to the
war itself. In general the Bremen antifascist leadership
felt that the population of the city became more receptive
to oppositional propaganda as a consequence of the air
raids.
Though
the city of Halle suffered only minor damage through raids,
the threat of bombing was always present. Nearby town and
industrial concentrations were heavily raided, and Halle was
on the route of the air fleets bound for Berlin. In the
judgment of Halle opposition leaders the onset of the great
raids on Germany in 1942 and 1943 was the first tangible
military evidence that Germany had lost the war. Persons
previously unapproachable were more receptive to
oppositional talk. Criticism of the regime was expressed
more openly. The great raids over Germany made it possible
for the opposition to come more into the open. It was
possible to speak to people in street cars and on the
streets. The opposition tried to direct reactions to news of
the destructive effects of raids into anti-Nazi channels by
spreading such slogans as "Je schwerer der Krieg auf uns
lastet, umso schneller kommt der Krieg zu Ende" (The heavier
the war weighs on us, the more quickly will the war come to
an end).
Increases in The Size and Intensity of Oppositional Activity
Evidence
from both the side of the Gestapo and the opposition
indicates an increase in the number, size, and intensity of
activity of oppositional groups beginning in 1943. These
developments, however, cannot be attributed in any specific
way to the air war. Encouragement to the opposition resulted
from the general shift in the war situation, of which the
air war was only a part. No evidence is available which
shows any connection between personal bombing experience,
and recruitment to active opposition, although such
experience may have been an important motivating factor.
Physical
and Administrative Disorder
One
of the important consequences of air raids for oppositional
activity was the creation of physical and administrative
confusion and disorder. The most dramatic evidence of this
aid to oppositional activity was found in Hamburg. According
to German army authorities there existed in Hamburg during
1944 and until the end of the war an enterprise to hide and
maintain army deserters. Neither the Military Police nor the
Gestapo was able to break it up. Leading Hamburg
Anti-Fascists claimed that they had been able to hide up to
thirty deserters at a time, in the air raid ruins in the
city. Some were hidden for as long as a year and more.
Identity papers were forged and jobs were found for the
deserters. The antifascists undertook a campaign of
encouraging soldiers on furlough in Hamburg to desert. They
would then hide and feed them until it was possible safely
to return the deserters to civilian life with false papers.
A
Gestapo official from Hannover testified that Russian
workers sometimes engaged in sabotage during air raids. The
plant police went into the shelters leaving the plant
unprotected. In a Hannover tank factory Russian workers took
advantage of this opportunity by cutting power transmission
belts, sabotaging guns and tanks. Claims were made by the
Leipzig left wing leaders that oppositionists wanted by the
Gestapo would be given out as air raid casualties, and were
enabled to commence new existences under false papers.
The
freedom of action of oppositional groups was also increased
through air raids as a consequence of the disruption of the
police apparatus. Gestapo headquarters were sometimes hit,
and valuable card files were destroyed. The network of
undercover agents engaged in the observation of oppositional
activities was frequently disrupted.
The
Breakdown of Oppositional Communications
Just as
the network of intelligence, communications and control of
the Nazis was frequently disturbed and sometimes even
shattered by air raids, so also did the activities of some
oppositional groups suffer from the same disturbances. This
was particularly true of groups which strove to maintain
more than local connections. The testimony of a member of
the Wehrmacht opposition is good evidence of this negative
consequence of air raids. This particular Wehrmacht officer
was functioning as a liaison man (Verbindungsmann) for the
Anti-Nazi officer circle. After the onset of larger raids he
found it increasingly difficult to maintain contact between
the various local oppositional Wehrmacht groups. He would
often arrive in cities only to find that the address to
which he had been directed was that of a bombed out house.
Frequently in the disorder and confusion in bombed cities he
would be unable to locate and reestablish the ties thus
disrupted by bombing. In Hannover a Communist informant
similarly complained th at it was difficult to reestablish
contacts even within Hannover itself after severe raids. He
pointed out that while the public was more receptive to
oppositional propaganda, contacts were disrupted and people
had less time to devote to carrying on oppositional
activity. This disruption of oppositional contacts in
Hannover was also reported from the side of the Social
Democrats.
A leader
of the Zentrum Party in Cologne pointed out that it became
increasingly difficult to call together small meetings of
oppositional people in a social way because of the continual
threat of air raids. The fear of raids was so great that
people were unwilling to go far from their shelters.
While
oppositional communications suffered as a consequence of air
raids, its importance should not be overestimated. By the
time of the outbreak of the war oppositional activity had
already been atomized by Nazi espionage and terror.
Oppositional organization was primarily local. The main
activity of organized resistance was propaganda, and the
main coordinating medium was Allied radio. The continuation
of these activities was not dependent upon an elaborate
system of communications. Connections within the town itself
could in most cases be reestablished after a raid without
much difficulty.
Physical
Exhaustion and Reduction of Working
Just as
Gestapo officials admitted that the increasing tempo and
severity of air raids wore them down physically and
psychologically and reduced the amount of time and energy
available for their work, so also did the effectiveness of
oppositional activity decrease from the same causes.
Evidence with regard to these air raid consequences came
from many areas in Germany but were particularly stressed in
reports from Cologne and Hannover, two cities among the most
heavily bombed in Germany in proportion to population and
area.
A leader
of the Zentrum in Cologne claimed that the air raids had
been so severe that all elements of the population lacked
the will and energy to engage in any activity save that
related to the immediate needs of finding shelter, food, and
safety. Leaders of the KPD and SPD in Hannover pointed out
that much of the time of the oppositional groups was taken
up in locating comrades after raids, in helping the
bombed-out to find places to stay, clothing, furniture, and
the like. They also stressed the physiological exhaustion
which followed after air raids, and the incapacity of people
to think of anything save the danger of the moment.
Types of
Bombing and Oppositional Activity
A
number of interesting connections between differences in
bombing experience and oppositional activity were observed.
The bombing of workers' quarters through raids on industrial
areas, and area raids created difficult problems of
explanation for the oppositional leadership everywhere. The
special severity of the bombing of Cologne, a Catholic city
never fertile soil for Nazism, appears to have created
hostility toward the Allies. The question on all sides was
"Why should Cologne, a city in which the Nazis had one of
their weakest footholds, suffer the most severe and most
continuous bombing of all?"
Two
members of the Austrian resistance movement who had been
eyewitness of the raid on Vienna of February 28, 1945, and
who had been able to escape to neutral territory, protested
against this area raid. [3] They claimed that the earlier
raids on industrial installations had been understood and
appreciated by the Austrian resistance groups, but the
"carpet raids" since September of 1944 had created hostility
toward the Allies among the resistance groups. The
informants stated that the destructive and aimless character
of the raids had embittered the population, and caused them
to make unfavorable comparisons of Allied bombing policy
with that of Russia. They also claimed that this type of air
warfare contributed to a favorable reaction on the part of
the Austrian population to the Nazi Lufiterror propaganda.
With
regard to the important question of the effects of
differences in the severity and continuity of bombing upon
oppositional activity the data on the whole is fragmentary
and inadequate. Some of the sharper contrasts may be made by
comparing the experience of Hamburg, Luebeck, and Cologne
[Table 3].
It is of
interest that the city of Luebeck received a bomb lead of
only 5,000 tons, and a large proportion of that in the
single RAF area raid in 1942. By the testimony of Luebeck
opposition leaders the primary effect of this area raid was
to arouse hostility against the Allies. The question raised
on all sides was, "Why should Luebeck, an anti-Nazi town of
little importance industrially, have been the recipient of
this first great area raid?" Parts of the older and
historically most valuable and picturesque areas of the town
were destroyed. In addition there was no follow up after the
1942 raid and the town was able to recover rapidly. In the
judgment of opposition leaders the specific air raid
experience of Luebeck, if anything, hindered oppositional
activity. Certainly the immediate consequences of the 1942
raid was to increase the hostility of the population against
the Allies.
The
contrast between Cologne and Hamburg with regard to the
extent and effectiveness of oppositional activity has
already been indicated. In Hamburg there was an aggressive
left wing tradition and comparatively large groups of
activists. In Cologne the evidence suggests a relatively
small amount of left wing and Zentrist activity. Both
political tradition and bombing experience contributed to
these patterns. Hamburg historically was a left wing town.
The most aggressive groups in general under the Nazis were
the left wing groups. Cologne on the other hand, was a town
in which the Catholic Party, the Zentrm, dominated. In
proportion to area and population Cologne received
approximately twice as heavy a bomb load as Hamburg. The
Hamburg oppositional groups according to their own testimony
were able to retain their aggressiveness, and utilize the
opportunities presented by air raids. The Cologne informants
report that although raids resulted in an increase in
war-weariness and susceptibility to oppositional pro paganda,
the severity of the raids was so great as to result in a
general breakdown of all activity including that of the
oppositional groups. Unfortunately data on other towns is
not adequate to confirm and elaborate this probable
relationship between the severity and continuity of bombing
experience and the degree and effectiveness of oppositional
activity.
Notes
(1.)
Gabriel A. Almond, (Ed) The Struggle for Democracy in
Germany, Chapel Hill, University of North Carolina Press,
1948, Chapters 2 and 3.
(2.)
The only Gestapo statistics which survived had been acquired
by the OSS, and were from the Meldungen Aus Dem Reich, for
the first six months of 1944. The Meldungen were the central
reports of the Sicherheitsdienst, Himmler's top intelligence
organization, and to have gotten them was a great coup for
the OSS. I got access to these reports through the
coincidence that the 0SS was anxious to get copies of USSBS
interviews with opposition leaders which I had in my
possession. Alex George, now my professional colleague at
Stanford, and then a Young GI working for the OSS, trailed
my team "through the underbrush" so to speak, and we struck
a deal--the OSS Meldungen for my interviews. I suppose that
these reports had been gotten by the OSS through an agent. I
never saw anything more than the reports for the first six
months of 1944, it may be that this is all that the OSS had.
All government departments were under strict orders to
destroy documents as the Allied armies neared. We
encountered charred records in some of the Gestapo
headquarters that we investigated. The copies that I
received from the OSS had been "sanitized." Anything
identifying how they had been acquired, or from which unit
of the Gestapo they had come, had been eliminated.
(3.)
This particular report came from an OSS document (#F 1583).
Consolidation of Statistics of Arrests from
The Regional Offices of the Gestapo for
January-March 1944
January February March Total
Communism/ 1,340 1877 1283 4500
Marxism
Reaction- 2079 2154 2322 655
Opposition
Consolidation of Statistics of Arrests From the Regional
Offices of The Gestapo for April-June, 1944
April May June Total
German Foreign German Foreign German Foreign German Foreign
Communism 391 882 523 1551 528 850 1442 3283
Marxism 90 24 107 7 85 15 282 46
Reaction- 294 235 321 246 399 324 1014 805
Opposition
Treachery 937 628 1204 709 2285 913 4426 2250
Bombing Experience of Hamburg, Leubeck, and Cologne
Pop. 1939 Total Percent Percent Percent High
Tonnage Night Area Explosives
Luebeck 185,000 5,000 49 49 67
Hamburg 1,711,000 41,300 52 65 82
Cologne 772,000 47,000 63 67 76
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