At the beginning of 1919 a new party made its
appearance on the already crowded and confused political scene in Munich,
the capital city of the young Bavarian republic. The establishment of the
German Workers' Party, as the new group called itself, went virtually
unnoticed. The formation of new political groupings was hardly unusual in
revolutionary Bavaria, and the German Workers' Party showed little promise
of developing into more than yet another short-lived Stammtisch-creation.
Few contemporary observers would have predicted that this party, which
lacked a program, an organizational structure, and financial resources,
would in four years develop into a decisive political force among the
Bavarian opponents of the Weimar Republic.
The German Workers' Party rose above its unprepossessing beginnings because
Adolf Hitler chose to associate his propagandistic and Organizational
talents with the new party, but at the time of its establishment he had no
connection with the fledgling German Workers' Party (Deutsche Arbeiter
Partei: DAP). The party was the joint creation of two men, a toolmaker,
Anton Drexler, and a journalist, Karl Harrer. Since initially Harrer was the
more dominant partner, the earliest political activity of the two men was
organized along lines suggested by him. Harrer preferred a
semi-conspiratorial discussion group to a public party as an organizational
format. At his insistence membership in the group, the "political working
circle," was restricted to seven.
I. Founding of the DAP
It soon became clear to Drexler, however, that
this type of activity and organization did not serve much purpose. Drexler
proposed that the Society should establish a political party to publicize
the group's political views, and win new members for its cause. Harrer then
yielded to the wishes of the majority and on January 5, 1919, the DAP was
organized. The formation of the DAP did not immediately establish the
organizational structure of what was to become the Nazi Party. For some time
the DAP existed largely on paper, while the "political working circle"
continued its regular meetings and thus remained the real focal point of
early Nazi activities. It was only during the spring and summer of 1919 that
the party gradually eclipsed its parent organization.
The DAP still had not found the courage to schedule public rallies, bot
Drexler and his friends invited ever-increasing numbers of potential
sympathizers. By August the party was already moderately well known among
rightist groups in Munich.It was now able to attract as speakers at its
meetings such prominent men as Gottfried Feder, the opponent of "interest
slavery," and Dietrich Eckart, at that time publisher of the violently anti-semitic
journal Auf gut Deutsch.
As the focal point of its political activities shifted increasingly from
semi-secret discussions to quasi-public rallies, the DAP was also forced to
expand the "political working circle's" organizational structure. Between
January and September 1919 the DAP built an organizational framework and a
membership base which were to prove an adequate foundation for the party's
later rise under Hitler. Despite Hitler's later belittling comments, the
organizational history of the early DAP was by no means without
significance. In the first eight months of 1919 Drexler had transformed the
DAP from a neglected step-child of the ''Harrer Society'' into a political
group that was "ready" for Hitler. Drexler's DAP was almost as ambitious to
expand the horizons of its political activities as was Adolf Hitler.
Both the DAP's political views and the party's decision to convey these
views to a larger public were links in the chain of events that led Hitler
to join the new party. The DAP's larger rallies attracted the attention of
the Bavarian Reichswehr authorities, and since Hitler worked for the
Reichswehr as a political indoctrination official, he was asked to report on
the activities of the new party. By his own account, Hitler was not
impressed by the organizational acumen of the group, but he did appreciate
the "good will" he found. He undoubtedly referred to the anti-semitism which
permeated the party's political message even then. In general, the DAP's
political program was neither a unique nor a well-worked-out series of
anti-capitalist, anti-democratic, and pro-nationalist sentiments. However,
while much in the party's program remained ill-defined and unspecified,
there was never any doubt about the party's anti-semitic views. Drexler had
made the DAP's anti-Jewish attitude public almost as soon as the party was
formally organized.
Hitler joined the DAP in September 1919. With his extra-ordinary talents as
a public speaker he rose quickly in the party's organizational hierarchy,
and by the end of the year he was both chief of propaganda and a member of
the executive committee. But Hitler was not content with his rapid
promotion. On the contrary, he continued to find a great deal to criticize
in the DAP. He was appalled at the inefficient and unbureaucratic business
procedures in the party and he severely attacked the system of intra-party
democracy that characterized the internal administration of the DAP. Like
most of the groups on the far right, the party took an ambiguous stand on
the question of democracy and parliamentarism. While it vehemently opposed
the national parliamentary system of the Weimar Republic, the DAP's internal
decision-making processes were subject to very elaborate democratic rules.
In December Hitler proposed a thorough reform of the party's organization.
At present, he claimed, the DAP resembled a ''club'' more than a political
party. As immediate measures to tighten the party's organizational
structure, Hitler demanded the dissolution of the organizational bonds
between the DAP and the "political working circle" and an increase in the
independent decision-making authority of the executive committee.
The DAP's old-line leadership rejected Hitler's ideas at this time, but the
proposals indicated a considerable level of political shrewdness on Hitler's
part, even at this early date. Unlike his more timid partners in the
leadership corps of the party, Hitler had recognized that the DAP as
presently constituted had no real political future. Like so many other
groups, the DAP understood the "evils" that had led to the collapse of the
empire and the establishment of the Republic. The party had even gone one
step further and decided to impart its newly acquired knowledge to the
public at large, but neither of these activities in any way singled out the
DAP from the dozens of extreme rightist groups. The present leadership was
content with the status of one among many.
When Hitler joined the party, the DAP's leadership regarded propaganda
activities as ends in themselves. Only Hitler looked upon public rallies as
the means to achieve a far greater end: the overthrow of the Republic and
the seizure of power by the far right. The differing concepts of the party's
future were reflected in the divergent organizational paths of Hitler and
the old leadership. An organizational structure administered along
democratic lines would be able to plan impressive rallies but would be an
ineffective conspiratorial instrument.
For the moment, however, the gulf that separated the political concepts of
Hitler and the old guard was still bridged by their agreement that the
party's immediate task was the improvement and expansion of its propaganda
activities. Here Drexler and Hitler formed a united front against Harrer,
who quickly recognized the futility of his opposition and resigned his party
post in January. This was undoubtedly a victory for Hitler, but he was still
far from controlling the DAP. Drexler became the new chairman, and while he
supported Hitler's views on propaganda, he was by no means a puppet. At the
time of Harrer's resignation the DAP also obtained its first full-time staff
official and a permanent central office. The new official received the title
of business manager, and there can be little doubt that Hitler chose the
first incumbent of the office, Rudolf Schüssler. He had not only served in
the same regiment as Hitler, but the two had worked together in the
political affairs department of the Bavarian Reichswehr after the war as
well.
Although the DAP was evolving into a more efficient and bureaucratized
organization, the old leadership continued to reject Hitler's more basic
organizational reform proposals. By late spring Hitler became convinced that
the DAP would not become a centralized, bureaucratized political party while
the old leadership retained its positions of power. If Hitler were to
transform the party into a power-centered instrument of political activity,
he would have to go outside the confines of the executive committee. Two
courses of action were open to him. He could attempt to win the approval of
the present membership for his ideas and thus force the committee to adopt
his scheme. This approach, however, held little promise of success. The
DAP's still relatively small membership was socially and economically, a
very homogeneous body. For the most part the members came from the same
social milieu as Drexler and the old guard (indeed, many lived in Drexler's
neighborhood), so that they could be expected to share the leader's views on
party organization. It was unlikely that they would desert the old
leadership.
Hitler, however, had an alternative course of action. Since he was the DAP's
only really effective public speaker, he could use his unrivaled talent at
propaganda to dilute the present membership with an influx of new members.
The old membership would obviously welcome the added stature that the
increased membership would bring to the DAP. At the same time it was clear
to Hitler, if not to Drexler and his friends, that a significant part of the
newly won members would join the party primarily because of Hitler's
association with it. Their first loyalty, in other words, would be to Hitler
personally, not to the DAP as an institution. Hitler was building a
following that could in time be used to overthrow the old leadership, if
Hitler chose. Beginning in early 1920, then, Hitler began to exercise his
duties as the party's propaganda chief with new vigor.
II. Development: 1920-1923
Paradoxically, the old guard eagerly supported Hitler's efforts. Drexler and
Hitler had already laid a foundation for the new drive by providing a more
specific party program. In December he and Hitler had drafted the
later-famous twenty-five points, a politically expedient mixture of extreme
nationalism, violent anti-semitism, vast promises to all social classes, and
Feder's ideas on the "breaking of interest slavery.'' Armed with this diet
of party goals, Hitler began late in the winter to introduce what was really
a new style of political propaganda. The DAP scheduled its first real public
rally on February 24, and other followed quickly. From the beginning
Hitler's appearances were deliberate, unique variations on the standard
themes of rightist diatribes. Like all rightist speakers, Hitler
deliberately exploited the Bavarian fear of Bolshevik revolutions.
However, while other parties made blatant appeals for middle class support,
Hitler and the DAP emphasized their interest in the lower and especially the
urban-worker classes. The reason was not so much a genuine interest in
social questions as a far-sighted maneuver to convince the Bavarian
Reichswehr and the post-revolutionary Bavarian government that the DAP's
activities represented a significant contribution toward the effort to build
a bulwark against further revolutionary attempts by the urban working
classes. The men who controlled the institutions of governmental power in
Munich in 1919 and 1920 had no sympathy with the German Republic.
The commandant of the Reichswehr, Franz von Epp, his chief of staff,
Erst Röhm, and the Munich chief of police, Erst Pöhner, were eager to
overthrow the Republic and openly encouraged and protected all effective
ultra-nationalist movements in their jurisdictional areas. Hitler's new
style of propaganda soon attracted their attention to the party, which
sometime in 1920 began to call itself the NSDAP, probably to give greater
credibility to the "socialist" content of its propaganda line. In December
of 1920, financial aid from the Reichswehr and Dietrich Eckart
enabled the party to purchase the Völkischer Beobachter, until then an
independent völkisch newspaper; and Erst Röhm, an early member of the DAP,
persuaded many of his fellow soldiers to join the party. As for Pöhner,
Hitler noted proudly that "he never missed an opportunity to help and
protect us."
Although in a short year Hitler had succeeded in lifting the NSDAP above the
obscure level in which he had found it in September 1919, his
accomplishments must not be exaggerated. At the beginning of 1921 neither
the NSDAP nor Hitler was well known outside the confines of Munich, and
Hitler had not yet challenged the organizational control of the old guard.
Yet, slowly, imperceptibly, Hitler's activities undermined the position of
the old guard. There was no smooth and steady loss of power on the part of
the old leadership, but in retrospect it is nevertheless clear that Hitler
increasingly gained control of the real power positions in the movement.
Thus the purchase of what became the official party newspaper, the
Völkischer Beobachter, was a very important milestone in the
organizational history of the NSDAP. Since, within the party organizational
structure, control of the paper's editorial content obviously fell to the
propaganda chief, Hitler had gained a significant addition to his power
potential at the end of 1920. The VB became an indispensable ideological and
organizational link between the party's central leadership and its local
and, later, provincial membership. The initial circulation of the paper at
the beginning of 1921 was 11,000, and while the monthly circulation figures
varied during the year, they never dropped to less than 7,500 and even
reached 17,500 in early 1922.
Hitler's increasingly prominent role in the NSDAP led to yet another
unobtrusive but significant development. Largely as a result of Hitler's
propaganda activities, a new group of unofficial leaders, a sort of shadow
leadership corps, collected around him. Dietrich Eckart became an intimate
friend and admirer of Hitler. Eckart in turn brought Alfred Rosenberg into
the party. Hermann Essler, a man of rather shadowy and unsavory origins and
habits, became a member of the new group. Emil Gansser acted as liaison
between Hitler and wealthy potential supporters. None of these men shared
either the values or the lower-middle-class origins of the old guard in the
NSDAP. They were either upper-middle-class individuals, like Gansser, or,
more frequently, asocial demi-monde figures.
Finally there is the most obvious and yet also most significant effect of
Hitler's propaganda activities in 1920. By the end of the year the efforts
of the Hitler group had vastly increased the party's membership, both in
Munich and in the provincial areas, and thus substantially diluted the
old-line membership. The party also expanded its network of locals in the
Bavarian countryside. The first local outside Munich was organized in
Rosenheim in April 1920, and by the beginning of 1921 the party was
organized in at least ten local cities outside the Bavarian capital.
Somewhat later in the year, the party even established a local outside
Bavaria, in Mannheim.
The creation of new locals outside of Munich weakened the old guard and
strengthened Hitler. The party that assembled in Munich for its first
national congress on January 22, 1921, was a far different organization from
the backroom discussion group Hitler had joined a little over a year before.
It now had some 3,000 members; it was a respected and influential part of
the extreme right in Bavaria. The most significant factor in the membership
and organizational growth of the NSDAP was the relentless work and magnetic
personality of Adolf Hitler. The old membership had been nearly eclipsed by
the influx of Hitler's followers, and it might have seemed logical that
Hitler would use the national congress to wrest control from the old
leadership. By this time there was certainly no lack of friction between
Hitler and the old guard. The old-line leaders and members were particularly
critical of Hitler's personal living habits, but there were also fears that
Hitler planned to become party dictator. In July 1921 the smoldering fires
finally erupted into open flames.
The issue of inter-party cooperation triggered the outbreak of open warfare
between Hitler and the old guard. The NSDAP local in Augsburg, with the full
knowledge and approval of the executive committee, negotiated an agreement
of mutual cooperation with the German Socialist Party organization in the
city. From the outset, both parties attached far more than local
significance to the agreement. On the surface, a union of the two parties
seemed logical and natural. They had largely identical programs.
Nevertheless, the old leadership of the NSDAP was not primarily interested
in creating a new and potentially stronger party. Its more immediate and
overriding aim was to deprive Hitler of much of his political influence in
the party. Hitler neither accepted the decision of the executive committee
to conclude the treaty with the DBP nor did he attempt to convince the party
leadership that its path of action was wrong. Instead he simply resigned
from the party. On July 12, he was again an unaffiliated politician.
The executive committee's hasty, not to say panicky, response to Hitler's
resignation was unnecessary. It soon became clear that Hitler had no
intention of attempting to split the party. Two days after he resigned, he
wrote another letter setting down his conditions for rejoining the NSDAP. He
demanded that in the future the party's organizational structure "must be
unlike those of other nationalist movements. The party must be instructed
and led in a manner that will enable it to become the sharpest weapon in the
battle against the Jewish international rulers of our people." As for his
own role in the party, Hitler demanded his election as first chairman with
"dictatorial powers." He had not forgotten the earlier organizational
proposals. A three-man action committee, named by himself, would replace the
executive committee as the party's basic policy-making body. Members who
refused to accept his terms would be expelled from the party. Finally,
Hitler insisted that the old leadership call a special party congress on
July 20 to effect his election as chairman.
One day later the executive committee capitulated. It agreed to accept all
of Hitler's substantive demands, suggesting only a postponement of the
special congress. The total and unexpected collapse of the anti-Hitler front
was due not to Hitler's convincing arguments, but to a split in the ranks of
he old party leadership. Drexler, to judge from the respect which Hitler
accorded him after the crisis, had personally decided to put the future of
the NSDAP into Hitler's hands. Drexler had always supported a vigorous
program of mass appeals, and rather than risk losing the party's greatest
propaganda asset, he urged the board to submit to Hitler's demands.
Hitler moved swiftly to consolidate his formal organizational changes with a
series of charismatic projections designed to transform the NSDAP's members
into disciplined Hitler loyalists. At the July congress he had been elected
chairman almost unanimously, but this represented a vote of confidence by
only five hundred members. Apparently, Hitler and his men were effective
persuaders. For by the end of August, Munich was secure; the membership was
willing to accept Hitler as party dictator. With the Munich membership as a
solid block of support behind him, Hitler could turn his attention to the
relations between central party headquarters and the locals outside the
Bavarian capital.
Hitler selected the 1922 national party congress to confront the provincial
leaders with the living presence of his charisma. The congress began on
January 29 with a Festabend, a device the NSDAP had frequently used to
combine propaganda with entertainment. This put the local leaders in the
proper frame of mind for the far more important session of the following
day. On the afternoon of January 30 Hitler addressed the assembled
leadership corps of the locals from outside Munich at party headquarters. In
a speech lasting two and a half hours he stressed the need for a "tightly
organized party leadership." In practice, Hitler specified, this would mean
that, while the local could remain financially autonomous, politically they
would become subordinate to Munich. At the conclusion of the speech, the
local leaders expressed their complete confidence in Hitler and the party's
new leadership. By the end of the evening Hitler was able to
institutionalize his charismatic triumph. The congress formally amended the
party's bylaws to enable the first chairman to expel entire locals at will.
The NSDAP of 1922 and 1923 was not a fully developed microcosm of the
stratified organizational giant of later years. Many of Hitler's
centralizing measures met with determined opposition from the membership of
the party, and many directives issued in Munich had little immediate effect
upon the day-to-day life of the party. Nevertheless, at least in retrospect,
it is clear that the NSDAP was rapidly losing its character as a political
party led by Hitler, and was developing instead into a group of disciplined
followers willing to submit to Hitler's personal wishes and dictates.
The new atmosphere in the party was particularly apparent during the 1923
national congress. It was in large measure a personal victory for Hitler,
and the entire atmosphere of the congress provided an eerie (if somewhat
amateurish) foretaste of the later mammoth annual Nazi congresses. As he
would so often in later years, Hitler reviewed a parade of the SA, dedicated
new flags, and outlined the party's future path to the assembled local
leaders. There were no discussions at this congress. Hitler spoke and the
membership cheered. The party chairman had become "the honored leader."
The 1923 congress was a mile-stone in the organizational history of the
NSDAP because it marked the beginning of Hitler's complete, personalized
control of the party's functionary corps and organizational structure. Ever
since the July crisis, Hitler had progressively cast the members and
subleaders' submission to the spell of his personality into forms of
institutionalized organizational hierarchy, centralization, and
subordination. Hitler persuaded the membership to give up voluntarily the
rights it had enjoyed under the democratic rules of the NSDAP and to accept
instead a framework of discipline and obedience to himself. In turn he
promised that his personalized control of the NSDAP would enable the party
to play a more effective part in felling the Weimar Republic and replacing
it with a Nazi-völkisch dictatorship.
III.The Beer-Hall Putch: 1923
The survival of the Republic appeared very doubtful in September 1923 when
Stresemann was bitterly criticized for calling off passive resistance in the
Ruhr and inflation had reached its last and giddiest stage. The Communists
were preparing to seize power, and in the Palatinate the French-backed
separatist movement was gaining ground. Even the imperturbable Seeckt was
thinking in terms of a right-wing dictatorship.
A big anti-republican rally was held at Nuremberg on the anniversary of the
battle of Sedan (2 September) in which the 'patriotic associations'
including the S.A. took part. Among the invited guests were generals,
admirals and members of former royal houses. Some senior government
officials were also present. Altogether about 100,000 people heard Hitler
speak. On the day that Stresemann called off the passive resistance in the
Ruhr, Kahr, the former Bavarian Prime Minister and a recognized strong man,
was brought back as State Commissioner with dictatorial powers. T
he Berlin government replied by declaring a state of emergency throughout
the Reich and conferring special powers on Lossow to deal with the crisis in
Bavaria. Lossow's military superior, Seeckt, was the subject of a vitriolic
attack in Hitler's Völkischer Beobachter, which suggested that he was
planning to make himself a dictator. Gessler, the Reichswehr minister in
Berlin, ordered the paper to be banned. Kahr refused. Gessler then demanded
Lossow's resignation. Kahr rejected this, claiming that Lossow was his
subordinate. There was now an open breach between the two governments. With
many other problems on its hands, the Reich cabinet was unwilling, and
perhaps unable, to take a firm line with the rebellious Bavarians.
In Munich the 'patriotic associations' impatient for action, were talking of
a seizure of power in Bavaria that would be the prelude to a similar move in
Berlin, where they would instal their own kind of regime, much more extreme
than anything envisaged by Seeckt or even by Kahr. On 24 October Lossow told
the patriotic associations that they could expect to march on Berlin in
three weeks.
But Kahr was urged by Seeckt to show restraint and not to intervene in
Saxony and Thuringia, where a Socialist-Communist coalition had come to
power. The fear in Berlin was that the Bavarian Reichswehr and 'patriots'
would occupy Saxony and Thuringia on their way north to Prussia. The central
government's intervention in the two 'red' provinces forestalled such a
step. While Kahr and Lossow waited for Berlin's next move against Bavaria,
Hitler, encouraged by Ludendorff, decided to strike. The date chosen was 9
November, fifth anniversary of the detested revolution of 1918 and the day
after an important patriotic gathering which Kahr was to address.
The story of the abortive Munich Putsch, which first brought Hitler into the
headlines of the world's press, is well-known and can be briefly summarized.
A large patriotic gathering met in the Bürgerbräukeller on the evening of 8
November to hear Kahr speak. The Bavarian Prime Minister, the police chief
(Colonel von Seisser) and other members of the government and officials were
present. In the middle of the proceedings Hitler, whose storm-troops had
surrounded the hall, burst in, brandishing a revolver. Mounting the rostrum,
he fired shots at the ceiling and announced that the governments in Munich
and Berlin had been overthrown and that a new 'National Republic' was being
formed. In Bavaria he himself would lead the new regime, with Kahr as Regent
and Pöhner as Prime Minister.
At Reich level Ludendorff was to be given command of the army with Lossow as
Minister of Defence and Seisser as Minister of Police. Temporarily stunned
by this irruption, Kahr, Lossow and Seisser (the 'triumvirate') retired to a
backroom where they agreed, at pistol point, to Hitler's plans. In the
meantime Ludendorff, still a legendary figure, arrived on the scene and,
overcoming his surprise, gave Hitler his backing. News of the Putsch was
flashed to all wireless stations and appeared in the early morning edition
of the Munich newspapers.
But in the course of the night the 'triumvirate', having returned to their
offices and learnt that their colleagues were opposed to the whole
enterprise, decided not to take any further part in it. News that Seeckt had
been given plenary powers by the Reich government influenced their decision.
Though Röhm occupied Army Headquarters in Munich, most public buildings
remained in the hands of the government. By midday the press carried the
news that the Putsch had failed. Ludendorff, apparently unaware of this, and
convinced that the army would not oppose a march on Berlin, persuaded Hitler
to hold a demonstration in Munich to rally support.
On its way to the Ministry of War in the center of Munich the procession of
2,000-3,000 Nazis found the way blocked by police. A shot was fired,
followed by a hail of bullets, and altogether 19 people (15 Nazis and 3
policemen) lost their lives. Ludendorff, marching at the head of the column,
was not fired on, but was taken prisoner. Hitler, dragged to the ground when
the man next to him was killed, fell and broke a bone in his shoulder. He
fled and was captured two days later. Among the other wounded was Göring,
the former air ace who had commanded the S.A. since March 1923. He escaped
to Austria. Röhm at Army H.Q. capitulated.
In a situation full of ambiguities the most intriguing question was the
extent to which Kahr and Lossow were accomplices with Hitler up to their
last minute withdrawal. They had acted unconstitutionally towards the Reich
government, and their hesitations about a march on Berlin were purely
tactical, though the kind of dictatorship they wanted would not have
satisfied Hitler. Lossow declared that he would march if he had a 51 per
cent chance of success, and Kahr's attitude, though more cautious, was
basically similar.
Although the two men were not involved in the charge of high treason that
faced Hitler, they were both discredited. They had failed to stop Hitler's
obvious preparations for the Putsch, and the assertion that their temporary
assent to Hitler's plans was only the result of duress was widely
disbelieved. Kahr resigned, and Lossow, who had disobeyed his military
superiors before the Putsch, was dismissed. Kahr's belief that he could make
use of Hitler without destroying his own position was typical of the
approach of many conservatives. Nine years later Papen was to make a similar
mistake, with more serious consequences. Kahr was to pay for his 'treachery'
with his life in the blood purge of June 1934.
The trial of the accused Nazis took place in February and March 1924. Hitler
accepted responsibility for what had happened, thus attracting the limelight
to himself, but he also drew attention to the share of Kahr, Lossow and
Seisser, thus embarrassing the judges and influencing them in favour of
leniency. In defending himself he seized the opportunity to make political
speeches which were listened to respectfully by a court whose members were
openly biased in his favour. His rousing oratory, defiant, not apologetic,
was addressed to a wider audience:
The army we have formed is growing from day to day . . . I nurse the
proud hope that one day the hour will come when these rough companies will
grow to battalions, the battalions to regiments' the regiments to divisions,
when the old cockade will be taken from the mud, when the old flags will
wave again, when there will be a reconciliation at that last great divine
judgement which we are prepared to face . . . For it is not you, gentlemen,
who will pass judgement on us. That judgement is spoken by the eternal court
of history . . . You may pronounce us guilty a thousand times over, but the
goddess of the eternal court of history will smile and tear to shreds the
brief of the State Prosecutor and the sentence of this court. For she
acquits us.
Though Hitler was not acquitted by the court which gave him such a
sympathetic hearing, its sentence of five years, detention was in the
circumstances mild enough; and in the event he served only nine months of
it. Even the Bayerischer Kurier complained of the one-sidedness of the trial
and described the day on which sentence was passed as a black day for
Bavarian justice. In prison Hitler was treated almost as an honored guest,
and given every facility for writing his memoirs. Without the nine months in
Landsberg fortress, the world might never have had Mein Kampf. Thus Hitler
used the failure of his Putsch to lay the foundations of later success.
A new phase began with Hitler's release from goal in December 1924. One of
his first acts was to assure the Bavarian Prime Minister, Held, of his
peaceful intentions, a gesture signifying the abandonment of violent
tactics. The reward was not long in coming: in February 1926 the ban on the
N.S.D.A.P., imposed after the events of November 1923, was lifted. The party
was to operate within the framework of the constitution. This had two main
implications. The first was that the S.A., hitherto a dependency of the
Reichswehr, now became an integral part of the party. Röhm, who disagreed
with the new policy, resigned and departed for South America. The S.A. was
reorganized under a new commander, a former Freikorps man named Pfeffer von
Salomon.
The other change was the decision to stand for parliament, which was taken
by Hitler with considerable reluctance and against the wishes of many of his
followers. The years 1925-6 were marked by a general debate inside and on
the fringes of the party on aims and methods.