THE STORY OF THE HOARE LAVAL PLAN

Background

When Samuel Hoare became Foreign Secretary on 7 June 1935, with the help of the brilliant Robert Vansittart, he wrote down the position as he saw it:

First, Hitler's strength was becoming daily more formidable, and his intentions more unabashed. 

Secondly, Japanese aggression threatened us with war in the Far East when we were not strong enough to resist Hitler in Europe and at the same time in the Pacific. 

Thirdly, it was essential to British security to have a friendly Italy in the Mediterranean that would both guarantee our lines of communication to the Far East and make it unnecessary for the French to keep an army on the Italian frontier. 

He was immediately faced with a crisis – the threatened Italian invasion of Abyssinia. 

There had already been a border clash (at WalWal , 20 December 1934), and Abyssinia had already appealed to the League, which had already discussed the situation in a special conference (the ‘League of Legends’ Conference 20 May 1935, which had demanded a resolution by August.)

Meanwhile, Mussolini had already done a deal with France (7 January 1935) which had promised him a free hand in Abyssinia, at least economically.  Mussolini had also approached the previous British Foreign Secretary, Sir John Simon, and asked him his opinion; Simon did not respond. 

Simon did, however, tell the Cabinet how dangerous the situation was, and (correctly) predicted Mussolini’s invasion in October, his defiance of the League, and the collapse of both the League and the Stresa Front (the alliance of Britain, France and Italy against German aggression). 

British Interests and Hoare's restraints

Everything, therefore, recommended Hoare to abandon Abyssinia to its fate.  Britain had no need for alarm at Italian ambitions as long as they did not involve neighbouring British Somaliland.  By contrast, Vansittart and the Foreign Office considered Abyssinia a backward country which made slave raids into British Somaliland … whereas Britain needed Italy’s support against Germany.  So Vansittart’s advice was that Britain and France should oppose Italy diplomatically, but – if Italy continued – should let the matter go and simply demand that Italy respect British interests in Abyssinia (the policy they had adopted with Japan in Manchuria 4 years earlier). 

But Hoare was not a free agent in that respect.  Britain was bound by its Covenant to the League.  Also, as an MP in a democracy, he was bound by the wishes of the electors, and in 1934, Britain’s League of Nations Union had held a national ‘Peace Ballot’, in which some 11 million people had voted overwhelmingly for the League of Nations, for disarmament, and for economic sanctions against any nation which defied the League.  Indeed, 6.8 million people had voted that Britain ought to be prepared to take military measures to support the League, to which the Prime Minister, Stanley Baldwin, had replied that “the League of Nations remains ‘the sheet anchor of British policy’”. 

The problem with that policy is that the League was very happy to play hard-ball with Italy … but then looked to Britain to enforce their decisions.  But Britain, still in the throes of economic recession, had neither the money nor the armed forces to go to war. 

Hoare openly complained of “the double policy I was pursuing of negotiations with Italy and respect for our collective obligations under the Covenant, based on Anglo-French co-operation”. 

Hoare Tries to sort it out

The only answer was to try to do a deal with Mussolini before the League met in August.  With the League clock ticking, on 23-24 June, Hoare send Anthony Eden to Rome to try to make an offer to Mussolini – some land and economic concessions.  Italy rejected it and treated Eden with disdain. 

Would alliances help?  Hoare approached the French Prime Minister Pierre Laval for help.  Laval was unwilling to do so – he needed Italian support against Hitler and, remember, he had already promised Mussolini a free hand in Abyssinia.  Hoare threatened France that Britain would withdraw from European affairs if he did not cooperate.  Instead, Laval tried to get Britain to lower its demands. 

On 29 July, Hoare sent a hint via the High Commissioners of the Dominions on 29 July 1935, “If Signor Mussolini would only go slow and proceed by the road of economic concessions and similar securities, he would get all that he could want in a comparatively short time”.  It was as good as a promise of a free hand, but by this time Mussolini was intransigent. 

A second (improved) offer to Italy in August was rejected. 

By this time, the League’s meeting was upon them.  Hoare gave an “electrifying” speech, promised sanctions, and sent the fleet to the Mediterranean.  The League responded by supporting Britain and suggested that oil sanctions would (literally) stop the Italian Army in its tracks. 

Meanwhile, however:

  •    The Admiralty told Hoare that it had no defence against air attack so close to Italy, had limited manoeuvrability in the Mediterranean, and was not ready for war. 

  •    British Imperial Oil had huge reservations about oil sanctions. 

  •    Mussolini told Hoare that, if oil sanctions were agreed, he would attack the British naval force.  He boasted to the Germans that Britain would not risk a showdown.  (He was right.)

The clock was now ticking on a new date – October, when the rainy season in Abyssinia ended, and Italy would be able to invade. 

In September, the League appointed a Committee of Five nations to negotiate a settlement. 

A third (even better) offer was made to Italy; Mussolini rejected it and in October invaded Abyssinia. 

The clock was now ticking on another date – November, when the League was due to meet to discuss oil sanctions.  Laval got the date delayed until 12 December. 

Another approach to Mussolini failed. 

The Hoare-Laval Plan

In December, Hoare and Vansittart went to Paris to deal directly with Laval.  Their instructions from Baldwin were to avoid war by any means.  The result, agreed on 8 December, was the infamous Hoare-Laval Plan – the decision to offer Mussolini a deal even better than everything he was demanding.  The idea was to get the Cabinet to agree on 9 December, and Italy on 10 December, before the League meeting on 12 December. 

The Cabinet agreed the Plan, but suggested that it would be better to get the 12 December League meeting deferred; when Hoare and Vansittart suggested that to Laval, however, he didn't agree. 

At this point, the whole argument became academic because the Plan was leaked to the French newspapers, and when the British public found out about the betrayal of Abyssinia, there was such a public outcry that the Cabinet was forced to change its mind and reject the Plan. 

And that was the end of it.  There was no chance now of a different offer, so nothing was done.  Britain and France refused to agree oil sanctions and so lost the confidence of the nations of the League.  Abyssinia was conquered and the League was ruined.  Italy left the League and the Stresa Front and soon after allied with Germany.  Germany re-occupied the Rhineland. 

And Hoare lost his job – he was forced to resign.  It’s an ill wind. 

So it was a disaster all round, but it is difficult to see what else could have been done.  The British public and the League were forcing Hoare to take a line which was actually against British interests … without either the money or the armed forces to enforce those decisions.  Thus – when Italy refused to negotiate – he was left with no other option but appeasement/capitulation.