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Source AThe day of battle itself, when these great fleets clashed, would disappoint the high expectations held by the leaders and peoples on both sides of the North Sea. While the battle did not lack in high drama, the day’s ending did not result in one side or the other winning a clear-cut victory. What Jutland did demonstrate was the lethality of modern naval warfare: in a single day of combat, the two fleets together lost 25 warships sunk and over 8,500 men killed. Those losses would have been even greater had it not been for, at critical moments in the battle, both the British and German fleet commanders taking actions to avoid risking the destruction of their battleships, turning away from the enemy rather than pressing the attack. The admirals took decisive actions during the battle’s course that precluded a decisive action. Instead of a single-day showdown to determine naval mastery, the fleets limped back home to lick their wounds after having inflicted appalling damage on the enemy. This ambiguous result would not stop both governments from claiming the trophy of victory. The day of battle had come and gone, but the cruel war at sea to command the maritime commons would continue on without respite until the conflict’s end more than two years later. Professor John H. Maurer, Remembering the Battle of Jutland (2016).
Source BThe Battle of Jutland was more of a skirmish than a set-piece naval battle. In effect, the German High Seas Fleet ‘blundered into the stronger British Grand Fleet while chasing what it assumed to be an isolated part of that fleet.’ Facing impossible odds, the High Seas Fleet skilfully turned around and slipped away into the mists of the North Sea, leaving the Royal Navy in command of the battlefield. Germany never risked a fleet encounter again and increasingly turned to the U-boat as a means of pursuing the naval war. Dr. Innes McCartney, The Archaeology of a Naval Battlefield (2017).
Source CFrom a century away, Jutland was clearly a British victory. They never lost control of the North Sea, and the blockade was ultimately a key factor in the end of the war. The simple analysis of losses ignores the fact that the High Seas Fleet on the whole was much more badly damaged than the Grand Fleet. After the fleets returned home, Jellicoe had 23 battleships and 4 battlecruisers ready for immediate action, while Scheer had only 10 battleships and no battlecruisers. The German ships spent a total of 40% more days in drydock than did the British in the aftermath of the battle. ‘Bean’, Jutland: Aftermath and Analysis (2018).
Source DBeatty was too slapdash and Jellicoe too cautious. Britain had the much bigger fleet, but lost more ships as well as more than twice as many men. It might be argued that Britain won because the German surface fleet retreated to base and never seriously troubled the Royal Navy again, but its impotence forced Germany to turn – with quick success – to the unrestricted submarine warfare that had such terrible consequences for British merchant shipping. A score sheet that adds up to clear victory or defeat is impossible. The Somme offensive that same summer overtook it as a tragedy, and as the years went by fewer and fewer people cared.. Ian Jack, writing in The Guardian (2016).
Source EJutland, was, for the Admiralty, a media disaster: the German High Seas Fleet, having retreated to port, issued prompt communiques declaring it their victory. The Admiralty was unable to report so rapidly; the British fleet was still at sea, and they had no information. When they did issue their own communique it was so badly worded as to make the British media interpret it as a defeat. This was embarrassing. The situation inspired the Admiralty to start a systematic propaganda campaign, as well as a review of how they handled these matters. elawrence, The Battle of Jutland – 100 years on (2016).
Source F[The battle of Jutland was placed at the centre of the US Naval College’s curriculum on strategy and tactics after 1919.] By intermixing strategic discussions of history with decision analysis reconstructions of past battles, the U.S. Navy arguably “won” the battle of Jutland in the classrooms and on the war-gaming floors of the Naval War College. Because of Jellicoe and Sims, the battle of Jutland influenced the perspectives of countless U.S. naval officers. For example, Commander Chester W. Nimitz mused in his Naval War College “Thesis on Tactics” that the battle of Jutland had “no equal in history [and that] it is doubtful if the total forces engaged in the battle of Jutland will be exceeded[,] at any rate during our time.” Nimitz recalled studying the battle in such detail that he knew every commander intimately and every decision they made “by heart.” Twenty years later, Nimitz commanded battles that far exceeded in scope the battle of Jutland, such as at Coral Sea, Midway, and Leyte Gulf. Arguably, education at the Naval War College provided the critical foundations that enabled him and his contemporaries to secure decisive victory in the Second World War. D Kohnen, The U.S. Navy Won the Battle of Jutland (2016).
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